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Patterns of Business Politics in Latin America
A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest with many lesser interests grow up of necessity in civilised nations and divide themselves into different classes actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government. James Madison, 1788 1
Variations in Business Organization
Patterns of business organization and relations between business and government varied widely across Latin America in the twentieth century. Coffee provides an early and illustrative example. By the middle of the twentieth century, Brazil and Colombia were the largest coffee producers in Latin America and coffee generated most of their export revenues, yet the economic and political organization of coffee growers in the two countries differed remarkably. The Colombian coffee sector had by the 1960s been thriving for decades and pulling much of the rest of the economy along with it. The association of coffee growers, Federacafe (Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia), had firmly established Colombian coffees in the high-quality, high-price segments of the world market, and coffee overall accounted for over two-thirds of Colombian exports.
2 The political power of the coffee elite and their association matched their economic clout. Federacafe was influential in a wide range of economic policies, and the head of Federacafe was viewed as the second most powerful man in the country after the president (Urrutia 1983, 116) .
By comparison, the marginal situation of coffee growers in Brazil, the world's largest producer, would probably have dismayed the Colombian elite. Brazilian coffee exports had also grown dramatically and by 1960 represented about half of Brazil's exports.
3 Brazilian coffee, though, filled the lower end of the market, and politically the organized, collective power of coffee growers was rarely mentioned. Of course, coffee was not economically as dominant in the larger and more diversified Brazilian economy, and the geography of coffee cultivation varied notably between the two countries. However, the major differences in the political economy of the two coffee sectors derived largely from the institutional and organizational legacies of the 1920s and 1930s. In 1924 state officials in Brazil created the Coffee Institute, which took over many functions of sectoral governance without the organized participation of coffee growers.
4
In Colombia in 1928, state actors delegated these governance functions (such as marketing, infrastructure, and credit), as well as control over an earmarked tax, to a new association of growers, Federacafe, that subsequently became a major institutional actor. Any general book on Colombian politics or development in the second half of the twentieth century devotes substantial attention to Federacafe; similar books on Brazil make no mention of a national organization of coffee growers.
5
In the 1990s, to take a more recent example, quite different patterns of business-government relations emerged in the large countries of Latin America in their respective negotiations over regional economic integration. Strong business associations in Mexico and Chile collaborated closely with government negotiators in devising the terms of regional integration. In Mexico representatives of government and business associations met literally thousands of times to exchange information, reconcile conflicting preferences, and work to reach consensus positions for Mexican officials to take into the negotiations over Nafta (North American Free Trade Agreement). In Brazil and Argentina, in contrast, government officials negotiated largely in isolation the terms of integration into their common market, Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur). Other political factors influenced business-government relations in these trade negotiations, but policy options for negotiators in Brazil and Argentina were generally constrained by the fact that business associations, especially in industry, were weak and unrepresentative.
The cases of coffee and regional integration are only two examples of many wide variations in the organization of business and in businessgovernment relations in Latin America. These variations have profound consequences for the kinds of issues business brings to policy making, what political channels they use to push their preferences, and what, if any, contributions they can bring to policy making and governance overall. These issues have become ever more important in recent decades as states have relinquished economic controls, greatly extending the realm of business discretion in the economy, and as democratization has generated new opportunities for open, organized participation by business in politics.
Why does the organization of business vary so dramatically across the large countries of Latin America? In this book I argue that most major variations in patterns of business organization -weak versus strong, rich versus poor, encompassing versus narrow, politicized versus neutral -can be traced back to actions of state actors and the cumulative effect of these actions over the twentieth century. In other words, states organized or disorganized business. This argument holds not only for the obvious cases where government decrees forced business to belong (state corporatism) but also for a range of formally voluntary associations. Especially in the case of voluntary associations, existing theory is poorly equipped to explain variation over time and space since much of it neglects the state and focuses instead on economic characteristics of the firms involved or, sometimes, on political factors like development strategies or regime type. A good deal of mythology, derived in part from overly simple economic models, sustains the mistaken impression that collective action is mostly the spontaneous, short-run result of individual calculations largely in isolation. In Latin America, capitalists did seem to weigh rationally the costs and benefits of investing in associations, but when they invested or disinvested, it was usually in response to prior actions by state officials and after evaluating other opportunities for political investment. State actions ranged from direct decrees outlawing some associations or obliging firms to join new state-chartered organizations to more indirect measures such as granting associations public resources or special access to policy makers. A core theoretical challenge is to explain how various types of state incentives for business to act collectively generate diverse organizational responses and how these responses cumulate over time into institutional capacity within associations.
An additional theoretical challenge is to specify when and why state actors are likely to want to organize business.
6 Historically in Latin America, as traced out in Part II, state actors sought to organize business in periods of economic and political crisis. The exact timing and nature of these crises varied country by country, but crises clustered across the region in the 1930s and 1940s and later in the 1980s and 1990s. In periods of crisis, state officials sought ways to reduce their vulnerabilities and bolster political and administrative support. So, for example, economic ministers caught in the middle of deep economic crises were likely, other things being equal, to solicit business support and to help business organize in order to manage the crisis. Other things were, of course, not always equal, especially over time, and successive teams of economic officials confronted evolving sets of associations. In the crisis years of the Depression and World War II, business associations were generally weak, if they existed at all, and state actors across all the major countries of Latin America intervened strongly to shape the organization of business. By the time of the crisis decade of the 1980s, the incentives for state officials to intervene in business organization were again strong, but state officials were constrained by variations in how the organizational space for business had in the intervening half century become more crowded and less malleable.
A cursory glance at the full range of business associations in the major countries of Latin America reveals a bewildering array of hundreds of associations, and larger businesses belong to several of them. The vast majority of these associations are similar across Latin America: they are small and narrow, and often consist of little more than a letterhead and a telephone. Where the differences are more striking and more relevant for policy and politics, as well as theory building, is in the voluntary associations that organized broad segments, or all, of the private sector. Table 1 .1 lists major voluntary, encompassing associations in five countries of Latin America and divides them between countries with strong 6 As specified further in Chapter 2, state actors are top officials in the executive branch.
Generally I subscribe to Stepan's definition of the state as "the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic, and coercive system" and to his three-way distinction among the state, civil society, and political society (that includes parties, electoral rules, and legislatures) (2001, 100-1). 
